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IN THE OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORIS C. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case 18991 
E. PUCKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from Judgment and Decree and the adverse 
ruling on Appellant's Motion to set aside judgment 
on the Fourth Judicial District 
in and for Utah County 
Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge 
PICHARD L. 
l\PXFIELD & Gi\J<JMON 
60 East 100 South 
Provo, rJtah 84601 
Attorney for Respondent 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & JENSEN 
930 South State Street Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84057 
VERNON F. ROMNEY 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & JENSEN 
930 South State Street Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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THE COURT CF TEE 
STP.TE OF UTAH 
QOP!S C. RUCKEP, 
Plaintiff-Resp0ndent, 
l/S. Case No. 18991 
DflLE E. RUCK ER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CASES CITED IN POINT I OF RESPONDEENT'S BRIEF ARE DISTIN-
GUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT CASE AND SHOULD NOT BE RELIED ON AS 
PRECEDENTS IN THE INSTANT MATTER. 
Respondent attempts to show that Appellant is invoking Rule 
60(bl without reguisite good faith and clean hands. To do this 
Arcpellant cites vs. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 951, 14 Utah 2d 
S2 (1962) for the definition of "good faith and clean hands"; 
tQr ren vs, Dixon Ranch Co_._, 260 P.2d 741, 123 Utah 416 (1953), for 
chc proposition that equitable issues also come into play in 
r
1e<jr;1r1y Pule 60(b) issues; and AirJs.&m-1D.tfilJJJQ.]JJ}tain Inc. vs. 
513 P.2d 429, 30 Utah 2nd 65 (1973) to show that Appellant 
1 ,J not use due d i 1 i gen c e. Respondent's cases are distinguishable 
1 
present case. 
Responoent relies on l:lu:.;L§ler, fur the cier:iniri,r 
"bad faith ano unclean hanos" when seek inc; relief under Pt.:ie 01; 
She then c 1 a i ms that the instant case is s i m i l a r to Ul.:L!ilu. 
However the Chrvsler case is net on point in the fc·llcwins fdtic.· 
la rs. In that case, Appellant Chrysler a ciivorce act,c· 
in Utah. In the instant action Appellant husbano is, anci Glw 2 ·0 
has been, the Defendant: 
P.fter l'.ppellant Chrysler initiateci his divorce proceccir·c,, nE 
was served with an Order to Show Cause by his wife. He then fleci 
to Nevaoa, established residency, and init:iateo divcrce 
ings there. In the instant action, Appellant has never f'.ed thE 
state to avoic service, nor has he attempted to establisr re,i-
dency in another state so as to initiate a civorce ir.' 
foreign jurisdiction. 
In Chrysler, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"When he found a contest there, <Utah> he fled fron' it 
and has tried by devious conduct to circumvent the 
effects of the action he cornmenceo, ano to defeat the 
jurisdiction of the Court from which he now seeks 
consideration." 303 P.2d at 997 
l'.ppellant Rucker has never tried tc ciefe2t the jur iEciict ic·n of tr•· 
Court. 
At the h e a r i n g u p o n t h e r1, o t i on t o s e t a s i e t h e J u ci g n E r.t. 
neither Jl.ppellant Chrysler nor his tlevacia actorney 2pr,carec 
cross-examination upon the facts alleged in their Aff 
2 
''rr d.cu 1;h tl:r_ trial J<JC1r3e deni<=d the Moticn on the basis of tr:e 
r:f) 1,'. 1 ns r:'Gdc, f1E. that shculci show his sood 
2iU• ''Y setting the Yevaca civorce and then filing e.nother 
''.ction, Cc:..:rt ',:cclC cr,tcrtc:ir-, it. Chrysler, hc11ever, spurnec 
:hL Ccurt's suggEsticn and elected tc stand upon the Order cenying 
the t!otion anc tc attack it by taking an appeal. In the instant 
case, Appellant appeared in perscn at his Motion to set aside 
Judgment, and never sho1;ed bad faith by filing a foreign divcrce 
actic'n. 
The Chrysler Court stated that a prirre requisite precedent to 
sranting Rule 60 (bl relief is that the movant demonstrate that he 
es be for e the co u r t w i th c le an hands and in. g o o d fa it h. Th a t 
Court then reviewec Appellant Chrysler's actions e.nd declared that 
his conduct fell outside the bounds of good faith. Appellant 
Rucker en the ether hand simply relied on information from two 
different officers cf the Court. 
Respondent makes much of an alleged g2r turning off incident 
ir, trying to establish Appellant's unclean hands. (Page 6 
Respondent's Brief) Two points are to be made concerning this 
attempt. first being that this allegation has never been 
ir. 2n'/ 2dversi2l hei:ring. It is a self-interested state-
-:nt truth of which has never been proved. Secondly, tte 
tas absclutel; nothing to do with the clean hands 
''''c'tr inc cc:poused in Rule 60 (b). It C!ces not show bad faith by 
l2nt in requesting reliEf under Pule 60 (b). 
3 
R e s p o n o e n t 0 1 s o re a k c :.; ,- ! ' < f h c r 1·1 o r n t e = t i " '.. 
kno 1,·:leCse ccncerning <: th· r:r'h' tr i:' 
<;c112ver, l\_ppellont has never rad tt'r q·r·- '. tc crcs=-= 
the Respondent in an adversarial scttin:, nor have thc=c 
serving teen proven in any adversarial 
Appellant has steadfastly der.ied that he kne1;, has fie• 
affidavits and ether material in support of ttet deniEl. 
Respondent would also have this Court tclicve that 
Dixon Ranch Co,,.§JJ.l2-1..Q, is directl:· en pcir.t. '!'t.:it suit \lC.2 
tc quiet title. On May 26, 1951, 11.[lpellant l\.rnold '.:'i;'.cr, "" 
served '.vith prcc2ss individually and as a Directer and 'C'r·Jster, cf 
the Dixon P.anch Cor..pany. r:e failec1 tc ans11er or notify thE stcc' .. 
hole'ers cf the pencing suit, and a c'ef.c;ult v;as entered a<Jainst hin· 
and the corr.p;:ir.y on July 11. l'.ppellant Pciul Dixon, anothe· stoc' 
holder first received notice cf the litisation on ;\ugu=t l', 
through publication of summons upcn another Defendant. h th€' 
employed counsel and filed an Answer and Counterclaim on Septerter 
13, sixty-four days after default had been entered. In the 
case, the Director and Trustee was served with process and faile6 
to notify the other stcckholders. In the rncsent case /\,ppell: · 
states ir. his sworn /\_fficiavit that he r.ever received nctice cf u.' 
change in trial dates. 
four days after default had been entered. Ir the present casE 
Appellant movec the Court to set asicc tr.c cccrcc tcr. 
it had been rendered. 
4 
l./e:;r,r,r6ent that 'c0rrcn propounds that equities come 
le wh<cr. oecic:inc; Pule 60 (b) issues. i'.ppellant agrees anC: 
1,,tr_: ti.cii: it wa::; inequitoble fer the 101,,1er court to deprive him 
c, f I , r <J F f' r t j' '/ J u C: i c i a l d e c r c e vi h e n , th r o u s h n o f a u 1 t o f h i s o I'm , 
r. l' '· a ' ri c t p r es en t an a w a c: u n a b 1 e to defend h i s i n t e r est s in co u r t • 
t' i n a l 1 y , P e s pond e n t r e 1 i e s on , .fill!U.£ , t o sh o w th a t 
Appellant aid not use due diligence in ascertaining when his trial 
c a t e 11 a s • I n th "' t c a s e t he C o u r t r u 1 e d th a t t h e De f e n d a n t s h o u l a 
n'"Je Deen responsible for getting in touch with his attorney, and 
nis failure to do so did not show reasonable diligence. In the 
vesent case i'.ppellant contacted two different attorneys who both 
tnld hin his court elate was on January 5, 1983. claims 
thrC'ic;h sworn testimony and knowledge that ''ppellant knew of the 
nc11 C•iurt date; yet Appellant's sworn /1.ffidavit states that he 
never received such notice, and that he did not know of the new 
court 
CONCLCSIOt 
!n the Chrysler case the totality of Appellant's action showed 
12ck of good faith and clean hands. In the ir.stant case, 
,,[Jpel !ant relied on two attorneys' stater.',ents as tc when his court 
,J,uc IH>ulc be. In the Director and Trustee of a company 
service of process ar.d failed to act, er notify the stock 
1 •·ero of the in11,enoiri9 action. In the instant case, Appellant 
r2tEc in a sworn Affiaavit that he never received notice of the 
court dates. Appellant also pleads equity in that his 
5 
property has been token f rc-r: h i:11 1-1 i tl1• ut an "! l'ut tun i ty to t.c ,,, 
in the matter. 
d i 1 i gen c e a cc o r ci i n CJ t o the 11.i..Lk.s:: .ID , s ta n d a r i n t ha t h 0 c n n t .. , 1 . 
two different attorneys to ascertain his rcurt ciate. 
/' 
Anorew 
Vernon F. Romney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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